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www.elsevier.com/locate/ypmedBook ReviewThe cigarette century. The rise, fall and deadly persistence of
the product that defined America, Brandt, A.M. (2007),
Perseus, NYThe Cigarette Century (Brandt, 2007) is the perfect title for a
history of cigarette smoking in the United States. The conquest
of western societies by the cigarette between 1900 and 1950 is
one of the most characterizing traits of the 20th century. Its
author, Allan M. Brandt, has been a fixture in the history of
public health at Harvard where he directs the Program in the
History of Medicine and the Division of Medical Ethics.
The book comprises four geometrically assembled chapters
(‘Culture’, ‘Science’, ‘Politics’ and ‘Law’), of 100 pages each.
Each chapter flows chronologically and covers around a quarter
of a century. The body of the text is sandwiched between an
introduction and a conclusion of 50 pages each, both of which
are written in a more personal tone with the author recalling his
impressions upon discovering the CamelMan in Times Square as
a child, and his experiences as an expert witness for anti-tobacco
litigation. The tempo is vivacious throughout with an impec-
cable, clean style. Overall, Brandt has touched all the bases
for his 500-page opus to be easily read and digested by a large
public.
‘Culture’, the first chapter, portrays somewhat simplistically
the cigarette industry as a sly corporation able to “create the need”
for its product among credulous Americans. Using a brilliant
combination of technology to produce millions of tobacco sticks,
manipulative publicity and lobbying, the industry attracted
smokers. Cigarette smoking, a rare habit in 1900, became ubi-
quitous in 1950. This single behavior may end up characterizing
the 20th century in the history texts of future generations. But can
the whole story be explained only by the wit of a handful of
industry leaders? Brandt notes that the market expanded beyond
the expectations of its own leaders. It is difficult to accept that
the industry created the need it would then satisfy. Wasn't it
the emerging urban and industrial environments at the turn of the
century that generated new needs in the population that the
industry was then able to translate into a craving for tobacco? My
hunch is that the decline of physically demanding work, trans-
portation and household chores created for the first time in human
existence an imbalance between the physical and mental load of
everyday life that opened the way to nicotine addiction. Purely
speculative, I agree, but if it was just a manipulation combined
with agribusiness and technology, why was it cigarettes and not
another competing industrial product (e.g., candies) that suc-
ceeded? This is an aspect of the history of cigarette where more
work would be welcome.doi:10.1016/j.ypmed.2007.11.018In ‘Science‘, which covers up to 1961, Brandt isolates with
great lucidity the reason why epidemiology was needed to
identify the health effects of smoking:
“Almost all the risks that would later come to be attributed to
smoking had been well documented by clinicians in the first
decades of the century. Even the risks of passive exposure to
cigarette smoke had been well articulated. Yet physicians and
researchers could not move from such clinical observations to
more powerful and generalizable assessments of the relation-
ship of smoking to disease. Surgeons like Ochsner [Alton
Ochsner, a New Orleans chest surgeon who became an anti-
tobacco advocate] might well be convinced that tobacco had
caused their patient's malignancies, but their observations
could never settle the larger question of causes and effect”
(Brandt, 2007, p. 128).
Indeed, demonstrating that tobacco was causing diseases had
to rest on comparative population studies, and therefore required
the expertise of epidemiologists. That was quite a challenge. The
chapter nicely synthesizes some ofwhat is known about the role of
epidemiologists in revealing the population effects of tobacco, but
does not break new ground. Classic figures like Ernst L. Wynder,
Richard Doll, and E. Cuyler Hammond are brought forward while
less charismatic but nonetheless key actors on the epidemiologic
stage, such as Jerome Cornfield or Morton Levin, are hardly
mentioned. It is unlikely that either historians or epidemiologists
alone could ever write a definitive story of the contributions of
epidemiology to this topic. The epidemiological literature rapidly
becomes too technical for non-epidemiologists, while the huge
volume of historical documents requires the expertise of
historians. Deeper insights into the full role of epidemiology
during the cigarette century may require a close collaboration of
historians of epidemiology and epidemiologists versed in history.
The book's best pages start with the ‘Politics’ chapter, which
spans from 1961 to roughly the end of the 1980s. In a first phase,
from the case–control studies of 1950 to the Surgeon General's
Report of 1964, the causal link had been established. But the
public health consequences of this demonstration were limited.
Cigarette sales plunged briefly after 1964 but soon recovered. The
stunning success of Phillip Morris, which grew from one of the
smallest to the largest tobacco company in the world during the
same period, symbolizes the industry's resilience. The demonstra-
tion of the adverse health effects of smoking fueled however the
campaign against passive smokingwhich had a tremendous public
health impact. Paradoxically, when passive smoking became the
“latest” culprit, science and epidemiologic evidence played a
much smaller role. The tobacco industry had easily attenuated the
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General's Report by claiming that smoking was an adult choice,
but it was caught in its own logic when the health of nonsmokers
and children became an object of litigation. As Brandt puts it:
“The public did not need ‘proof’ that passive smoke could cause
lung cancer to decide that it wanted smoke-free workplaces,
restaurants and transportation” (Brandt, 2007, p. 296)
In telling the litigation history, Brandt finds the right words to
describe the epic campaign of a heterogeneous coalition of anti-
tobacco activists, lawyers, politicians, and state attorneys against
the tobacco corporation. The recognition that second hand smoke
killed innocent victims is related to the successful flight attendant
trial in 1992. Norma Broin and her colleagues were non-smoking
womenwho had served as flight attendants in smoke-filled cabins
of American Airline planes for years and developed lung cancer.
They sued PhilipMorris and, inOctober 1997, the industry agreed
to pay $300million to establish an institute supporting research on
tobacco smoke and health. Such class action suits filed against
tobacco companies evolved into the coordinated action of several
states and a multi-hundred million dollar settlement, but no le-
gislation. The settlement, however, according to Brandt, tasted
bitter for anti-tobacco activists and was “one of the industry's
most surprising victories” (p. 438):
“Not surprisingly the outcome was skewed by the particular
participants' interests. The attorneys general secured revenues
for their states, the trial lawyers secured astronomical fees; the
industry secured relief from potential bankrupting litigation;
and public health got the short hand.” (Brandt, 2007, p. 438).
What went wrong? Too much litigation and insufficient legis-
lation? Since the Surgeon General's report had established the
causative role of tobacco in lung cancer, the attempts to force the
tobacco industry to compensate its past victims and stop harming
new ones took two main directions. Lawyers built cases and tried
to bring the tobacco companies to their knees using litigation.
At the same time, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
congressmen sought to constrain the industry to respect the public
health. Brandt shows that neither of the two strategies fully
succeeded:
“To view litigation and legislation asmutually incompatible is to
misrepresent their complex historical relationship. The question
was never legislation or litigation. Any successful strategywould
need to employ both approaches” (Brandt, 2007, p. 439).
Simple evidence of the significant contribution of litigation
has been the public release of millions of pages of internal
documents of the tobacco industry. Legislation, on the other
hand, could have established real constraints on the industry but
required political support that it did not receive:
“Legislative action would require the development of political
will that public healthmeasures have largely failed to generate.
It is difficult, for example, to name a single piece of major
public health legislation since 1995” (Brandt, 2007, p. 442).
In the closing chapters, Brandt shows that, while battling in
America, the tobacco industrywas expanding itsmarkets overseas,especially in the developing world. The tobacco epidemic
has become global. Hopefully, every nation will not have to go
through its own cigarette century and fight the same battles,
but international alliances, such as the one WHO assembled to
promote the multilateral Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control, will make the achievements of the most protected pop-
ulations available to the rest of the world all at once.
Telling the history of cigarette smoking is not a straightforward
task. It involves understanding the contribution of many scientific
disciplines, from laboratory to population sciences. One needs
to be familiar with clinical medicine, legislation, and litigation.
The story spans many decades and is documented by an overwhel-
ming quantity of written evidence. The historian faces a daunting
challenge and there are many ways to address it. Brandt ac-
knowledges his debt to Richard Kluger, the author of Ashes to
Ashes (Kluger, 1997). The latter and The Cigarette Century are
companion books in both content and style. Content-wise, the two
books overlap but Ashes to Ashes stops in 1996, when FDA
regulatory plans had not yet been dismissed. The Cigarette
Centuryprolongs the story for another decade. Style-wise, the two
books could not be more different. Kluger was fascinated by the
people who made history. He performed many interviews and
provided lively portraits of the main protagonists. Brandt focuses
on strategies and processes. He is more abstract but gives us a
unique perspective on the global picture. If you will allow me this
analogy, it is as if one takes a guide to explore the Amazon. Ashes
to Ashes takes you rafting on the river, while The Cigarette
Century flies you over it in a helicopter. I would hate tomiss either!
I particularly recommend The Cigarette Century to people
interested in acting to protect the health of the public. The
lessons of tobacco prevention are important per se (the cigarette
remains a major crippler and killer worldwide), but they also
inform more widely about possible strategies to control emerg-
ing threats resulting from the converging interest of business,
government and technology, such as the surfeits of obesity and
diabetes we are currently witnessing worldwide.
Perhaps involuntarily, the tobacco industry itself is the live-
liest character in The Cigarette Century. Brandt gives it life,
intelligence, pain, energy, power, weaknesses and cruelty, stra-
tegic erring, and resilience. A monster that has not found its
slaughterer yet and has been able to recuperate from its foes'
hardest, life-threatening blows. No doubt the tobacco saga will
now have to contend with this new Brandt.
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